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COMMENT AND DISCUSSION 
Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of an 
Implicit Debate 
Carine Defoort 
Department Oosterse en Slavische Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
"Philosophy" is the showpiece of our university: every freshman student is required 
to follow a general course on philosophy. But regardless of the ways in which this 
course may be considered general, the fact is that attention to non-Western cultures 
is absent throughout. The course is not titled "General Western Philosophy," and yet 
philosophy is, quite simply, a Western matter. This demands no further explanation; 
it is taken for granted. It should come as no surprise that China starts from an entirely 
different presupposition. Several philosophy departments have a branch dealing with 
Chinese philosophy, analogous to those offering Western and often even Indian 
philosophy. But not one Chinese university teaches exclusively Chinese philosophy, 
let alone under the title "General Philosophy."' 
In the light of such an imposing state of affairs, the question inevitably comes to 
the fore: is there indeed such a thing as "Chinese philosophy"? However, the degree 
of certainty with which the conflicting positions are held is not the result of thorough 
research, painstaking debate, or well-founded reasoning. For these have hardly even 
begun. In both the West and China, the answer to this question consists mostly of 
implicit presuppositions. It belongs less to the domain of explicit opinion than to 
the implicit frame within which we function: the organization of universities, book- 
shops, journals, and conferences all confirm a vision that, in fact, they have seldom 
explicitly discussed. The topic is therefore rather sensitive: any explicit rejection of 
the existence of Chinese philosophy implies not only a painful break with the raison 
d'etre of more than a thousand Chinese academics but also a blow to China's 
national pride. On the other hand, the insistence that general introductory courses to 
philosophy ought to include philosophical traditions laid claim to by other cultures 
would certainly disturb Western colleagues in the field. 
From this one might be inclined to conclude that such strong emotions and 
exaggerated sensitivities-a Western chauvinism on the one hand and an overly 
sensitive Chinese self-insistence on the other-are obstacles to a mature discussion 
of this nevertheless fundamental question. The arguments presented here, on the 
contrary, shall endeavor to show that this conclusion is not entirely correct. Several 
concrete arguments have been forwarded in this debate, and insofar as this conclu- 
sion is correct, I will argue that this very sensitivity is an interesting phenomenon, 
one that is unjustly being neglected. 
The following analysis of the implicit debate has a relevance beyond the field 
of "Chinese philosophy" since a similar problematic forwards itself not only in 
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analogous controversies around entities such as "Chinese science" or "Chinese 
religion"2 but also in the case of other non-Western cultures reinterpreting their tra- 
dition in terms of modern Western concepts. The existence of Chinese philosophy 
thus acts as a case study for a wider problematic. 
It is certainly not my intention to solve the crucial question concerning the le- 
gitimacy of Chinese philosophy once and for all-this would be an impossible task 
given the indecision governing the definition of the concept of philosophy even in 
the West. Nor do I wish to call into question the legitimacy or value of two domains 
that are closely adjacent to the theme of this essay, namely "philosophy in China"- 
the philosophical activities of contemporary Chinese academics-and current 
"Chinese philosophy," insofar as this refers to a purely geographical variant of 
something like contemporary "Continental philosophy."3 The arguments presented 
here concern only the traditional Chinese body of thought, which is generally 
labeled as "Chinese philosophy." A clear definition of our domain is thus our first 
task. 
The Expression "Chinese Philosophy" 
Doubt over the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy is not exclusively the result of 
Western chauvinism. Indeed, the expression "Chinese philosophy" encompasses a 
strange paradox, which threatens to call its very identity into question. Just like other 
concepts such as "science" or "human rights," philosophy, by definition, makes a 
certain claim to universality, without thereby denying its particular, Western origin. 
"Spanish science" or "Swiss human rights" sounds strange to our ears because the 
adjectives in these expressions pose a threat to the universal pretensions of the re- 
spective nouns. Whatever these expressions might mean, we are not inclined to 
accept that they refer to a type of science or human rights that is only valid in these 
countries. Philosophy is somewhat more lenient in this respect: we are accustomed 
to such expressions as "Continental" or "Anglo-Saxon" philosophy, denoting dif- 
ferent types or genres within the philosophical tradition. But even here we do not 
accept that the adjective stakes such a claim upon the noun that "Continental phi- 
losophy" could only be grasped by the European continental mind. In the expression 
"Chinese philosophy," however, the grip of the adjective upon the noun appears so 
strong that philosophy risks being suffocated. 
One important reason for this is that the term "philosophy"-just like many 
other Western terms-has been applied to the Chinese tradition in retrospect. Dur- 
ing the nineteenth century, Japan opened its doors and turned to the West for inspi- 
ration and modernization. So did China with the coming of the twentieth century, 
sending students to Japan to learn of its success. A Japanese scholar, Nishi Amane 
(1829-1887), had studied in the Netherlands and translated books into Japanese, 
among which were some on philosophy (in 1873). He invented a Japanese term 
on the basis of two Chinese characters: the "study" of "wisdom" ~ m-tetsugaku 
in Japanese, zhexue in Chinese.4 This was not particularly new; already in the 
seventeenth century, Western missionaries had labeled the great Chinese masters 
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and other classics (among them the Yijing or Book of Changes) as philosophy, and 
this while their Chinese contemporaries described Aristotle's work in Chinese terms 
(qiongli gewu 4Wf).5 What was new at the end of the nineteenth century was 
the disappearance of this cultural balance labeling the other in one's own terms. Not 
only did Western philosophical terminology dominate proceedings, but it was also 
eagerly adopted by the Chinese, through Japanese translation, in the description of 
their own thought tradition. That part of the textual corpus that was traditionally 
assigned to the masters (zhuzi UT) along with some books of the Confucian Canon 
(jing i_)-continuing from the fifth century B.C. (by our count) up until the nine- 
teenth century A.D.-has been retrospectively branded as "Chinese philosophy" 
(Zhongguo zhexue t~ -r).6 
The strange thing is that this introduction of philosophy in China around the end 
of the nineteenth century, together with other disciplines and above all in the con- 
text of radical institutional changes, has practically marked the end of this very tra- 
dition of the masters. Those who nevertheless continue to study the old masters in a 
separate branch within philosophy departments no longer call themselves "masters," 
but rather "specialists" in Chinese philosophy.7 The curriculum of this separate 
branch consists mainly of traditional Chinese thought as it existed up until the in- 
troduction of Western thinking. Historical compilations of Chinese philosophy also 
often stop at the end of the nineteenth century or the beginning of the twentieth.8 
Thus, at the moment when Chinese philosophy was retrospectively created or rec- 
ognized, it also largely ceased to exist as a living tradition. "Chinese philosophy" 
seems to have died of its own birth: "Chinese philosophy" (of the traditional masters) 
and "philosophy in China" (at modern universities) exclude each other in the sense 
that, since the introduction of the latter, the former could only continue to exist in 
a foreign institutional setting, as a separated corpus and object of study. The fatal 
allergic reaction that the Chinese masters have developed toward this strange disci- 
pline raises questions regarding their combination: is this actually Chinese? And is it 
still philosophy? 
This short analysis of the expression "Chinese philosophy" lends some plausi- 
bility to doubts concerning its legitimacy. But the dispute is not thereby settled. The 
next two steps of this essay shall construct a typology of the debate, following above 
all the lead of contemporary Chinese scholars who, not surprisingly, have more at 
stake in this question than we do. 
A Conflict over Facts 
At the bottom level of this debate one can distinguish two opposing positions, which 
imply, although sometimes also explicitly state, that Chinese philosophy either does 
or does not exist. One could call this first level a disagreement over facts, a level that 
is quickly overtaken once one is able to articulate and ground it in argument. But it is 
nevertheless worthwhile to explicate and reflect upon the characteristics of these 
two opposing positions. 
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First Position: Chinese Philosophy Does Not Exist 
The position that denies the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy is primarily, though 
not exclusively, implicit and Western. The strongest arguments are of both a histori- 
cal and a theoretical nature. The historical argumentation departs from the irrefut- 
able fact that philosophy is a well-defined discipline that came into existence in 
Greece and has expanded throughout the West, just as the masters (zhuzi) are con- 
sidered a product of Chinese culture. The masters lived between the fifth and third 
centuries before our era in a region toward the lower reaches of the Yellow River, 
during a period of social mobility and relative affluence, and when there was a need 
for political advice. Just as the West cannot lay claim to its own "zhuzi," there were 
no "philosophers" at that time in the area that we now call China. It cannot be 
denied that philosophy has quickly spread itself over the whole world within just a 
century-as have so many other cultural products of the West-and that it has also 
set root in China. But the present existence of "philosophy in China" does not yet 
justify the retrospective appropriation of this term by a thought tradition that was 
ignorant of the then still exclusively Western discipline. 
But this historical argument does not stand alone. Had the resemblance between 
the Chinese masters and the Western philosophers been convincing enough, then 
there would have been little opposition to their respective identification. We speak 
of Chinese houses and palaces without implying that these constructions exactly 
coincide with European architecture. For this reason, the historical line is often 
coupled with a theoretical argument that states that the Chinese masters do not in 
general-and certainly not entirely-satisfy the conditions of philosophy. Western 
academics may, of course, differ regarding the definition of this term, but there is 
nevertheless a vague consensus that allows for a variety of writings under the label of 
philosophy, but not for just anything. Philosophy must give the appearance of sys- 
tematicity, reflection, and rationality; it must differ from science and religion; and it 
must be divisible into various subdisciplines such as metaphysics, logic, and epis- 
temology. A great deal of the teachings of the old Chinese masters from the so-called 
Golden Age of Chinese philosophy (the fifth to third centuries B.C.) rarely meet these 
demands. Thinkers like Laozi and Confucius, who are traditionally branded as the 
founders of Taoism and Confucianism, respectively, expressed themselves in short 
proverbs, aphorisms, or conversations without concerning themselves too much with 
systematicity, logic, or any other philosophical criterion. 
Finally, this theoretical argument is lent further currency from the recent histori- 
cal context within which China's masters were re-baptized as philosophers. This 
conversion was inspired not only by a grounded conviction in a striking resem- 
blance, but rather by the solicitude of national strength and self-worth. China had 
undergone much foreign humiliation since the Opium War, and its internal situation 
had been cause for concern as well. The country wanted to rebuild itself on the 
Japanese model, for which China sought foreign inspiration. Seeing that philosophy 
in the West seemed to accompany strength and esteem, Chinese scholars decided 
not only to train themselves in Western philosophy but to label as such their own 
inherited thought tradition. The success of this argument in China can of course 
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be reversed with equal vigor by Westerners: the conversion of masters into 
"Chinese philosophy" was predominantly a political issue, not the result of care- 
ful consideration.9 
Second Position: Chinese Philosophy Exists 
The second position is best and most explicitly represented in contemporary China. 
But it also exists, although more implicitly, in the West. The fact that the first position 
exists above all in the West does not mean that all Westerners are won over by it. 
Perhaps the anonymous majority assumes that something like Chinese philosophy 
must exist since many bookshops have dedicated a section to it, albeit between the 
sections on "astrology" and "erotic massage," and since various universities provide 
lectures on it, albeit not at philosophy departments.10 This vague consensus that 
something like Chinese philosophy must exist says nothing of people's knowledge or 
appreciation of it: even Hegel spoke of Chinese philosophy without attaching any 
positive significance to it.11 
In comparison with the implicit power of the first position in the West, the 
second position leads a somewhat more explicit existence in contemporary China. 
The modern Western concept of philosophy that reached China at the end of the 
nineteenth century did not introduce itself as the proud ambassador of a particular 
culture-such as French wine or Belgian chocolate-but as something universal, 
a rational pursuit that every respectable culture must be able to discover within 
itself. This discovery progressed very smoothly: as European missionaries in the 
seventeenth century had already remarked, China had already known twenty-five 
centuries of philosophical tradition. According to this second position, the word 
"philosophy" is quite simply the Western term for the discussions and speculations 
of, by and large, the traditional "masters," despite the cultural variations.12 
Because this position is more explicit, its representatives are also more clearly 
identifiable. The most famous of them was Feng Youlan ,: (1895-1990), and 
the oldest was perhaps his mentor, Hu Shi iAg (1891-1962). The illustration of 
the second position is dominated to a great extent by their reasoning. Feng Youlan 
studied at Columbia University, taught at American and Chinese universities, and in 
later life was awarded with honorary doctorates in the United States and in India. 
Feng thought that Chinese and Western thinkers expounded on similar concerns and 
experiences and thus, without knowing it themselves, participated in the universal 
human project of philosophy. The foreword to the first volume of his A History of 
Chinese Philosophy does not explicitly argue that "Chinese philosophy" exists but 
reflects on its worth, thus assuming that it does exist. Through the questions he poses 
regarding the value of Chinese philosophy, one can make out that Feng's notion 
of philosophy is closely related to the above-mentioned vague Western consensus. 
His explicitly stated criteria are: systematicity, originality, and subdivisions. Further- 
more, Feng holds that the masters didn't score too badly on these points, given the 
reader's willingness to engage them with some effort: there is an implicit presence 
of a structured philosophy in their texts, but it is up to us to make it explicit; philo- 
sophical progress and originality lie hidden in inconspicuous commentaries, and it 
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is up to us to discover them; weak points in Chinese philosophy, in particular epis- 
temology, metaphysics, or logic, are often the result of the masters' selective atten- 
tion and conscious decision, and it is up to us to appreciate this.13 
In his overview of the history of Chinese philosophy, Feng concerns himself 
primarily with the first point, namely the explication of implicitly regulated thoughts. 
For him, the best way to systematize ancient Chinese thought is through philoso- 
phy. His books are therefore teeming with all kinds of Chinese neologisms for 
terms such as "humanism" (renwen zhuyi A}i-t), "realism" (shizaizhuyi ~t~i), 
"pragmatism" (shiyong zhuyi f1Al&5t), "skepticism" (huaiyi zhuyi fftSC), 
"utilitarianism" (gongli zhuyi t5ilJiZT), "principles" (yuanze Ji#Jj), "essences" 
(benzhi )Ri), "definitions" (dingyi /t), "reason" or "truth" (daoli /_M), and so on. 
Feng thus offers his contemporaries new glasses with which to gaze upon their own 
tradition, providing an enrichment and liberation for which many Chinese intellec- 
tuals are still grateful. 
The oldest philosophical presentation of Chinese thought in terms of philosophy, 
however, is to be found in the works of Hu Shi, in volume 1 of his Zhongguo zhexue 
dagangr PiiJ'ctfx (Overview of Chinese philosophy), which appeared in 1919. As 
an enthusiastic proponent of John Dewey, pragmatism, and the American philoso- 
phy of that time, Hu Shi sought after traces of such pragmatic, logical, and realist 
thinking in the Chinese corpus. Within this project, his most renowned book, The 
Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China (1922), often goes radically 
beyond the centuries-old, traditional interpretations of the classical texts in order to 
bring to light unnoticed passages and thinkers. For example, the practical, utilitarian, 
and rather populist school of Mohism, which, under the pressure of Confucianism, 
historically never enjoyed much notoriety, was thrust to the foreground by Hu 
Shi.14 
A philosophical reading of ancient Chinese thought is typical of the second 
position and can adopt different forms. An extreme variety of this is the compul- 
sive use of the Marxist opposition between "idealism" (weixin zhuyi l,t,3x) and 
"materialism" (weiwu zhuyi PtA3iX). The communist vision, which classifies and 
interprets the masters according to this opposition, characterizes the idealists as 
aristocrats concerned with all sorts of abstract, metaphysical truths and repressive 
moral principles, while the materialists were prized for their resistance to this and 
their attention to concrete, material reality. A first tendency within these Marxist 
parameters consisted of defining all Chinese thinkers from before the liberation as 
"idealistic." Thereupon followed the tendency to interpret the whole evolution of 
Chinese thought in terms of a progressive dialectic between two streams of thought, 
and a gradual but constant growth toward materialism.15 From the 1950s onward 
until the early 1980s, almost all disputes concerning Chinese philosophy in the 
People's Republic were carried out within this framework. Questions to be discussed 
inquired into which aspect of which classical philosopher and to what extent he 
was idealistic or materialistic, and how this echoed another aspect of his thought 
and social background. It was most difficult to put the frame of thought itself 
into question, seeing that the government had imposed it as an objective, scientific, 
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proletarian, and socially responsible method for opposing the Western bourgeois 
approach of those like Hu Shi and Feng Youlan. 
Nowadays, this Marxist framework is often left in silence by the wayside, but it is 
seldom the target of direct attack. Not only are scholars conscious of avoiding 
politically sensitive issues, but the framework itself is so conceptually weak that it 
is largely undeserving of much philosophical attention. Nevertheless, this Marxist 
framework certainly had its value in providing a fresh perspective after a long history 
of predominantly Confucian domination in China. Namely, the opposition between 
idealism and materialism focuses attention on the social background of diverse 
thinkers and the influence this has had on their insights. It is encouraging to see how 
the sensitivity to political context and social background, now released from its 
Marxist categories, continues to stimulate fruitful research by young scholars such 
as, for instance, Wang Bo (b. 1965), lecturer in philosophy at Peking University.16 
An Evaluation of the First Position 
There is much that could be said for both positions, and a defense of one is simul- 
taneously an attack on the other. An advantage of the first position is that it aims to 
avoid a problem of the second position, namely the conceptual confusion of which 
the retrospective attribution of a philosophy to traditional China was a part. But this 
confusion is like a mountain of which only the peak presents a stumbling block for 
the first position. To shed light upon this "peak," we need to view the mountain in its 
various articulations. 
At its foot we locate the philosophical neologisms, which, despite their com- 
plexity, can be organized into three groups.17 The least problematic of these, from 
the standpoint of the conceptual confusion, are the transliterations through which 
the Chinese characters offer a primarily phonetic representation of the English term 
(e.g., luoji i4_ for "logic"). Equally unproblematic is the second group consisting of 
translations constructed on the basis of relatively neutral terms (e.g., keguan 4I, 
literally "view of the guest," and zhuguan tiA, literally "view of the host," for the 
concepts "objective" and "subjective," respectively). The most problematic, how- 
ever, because most confusing, is the third group of philosophical neologisms, which 
were formed from the translation of separate or integrated endemic terms that 
appeared to overlap with the corresponding Western ideas, but that also covered a 
rich and controversial gamut of political, historical, and intellectual connotations. 
For example, the prevailing Chinese word for "reason" or "truth," daoli, is con- 
structed from two terms that themselves have a history spanning more than two 
millennia: dao 'i ("way," "method," "doctrine") and ii _ ("pattern," "principle") 
belong to the most difficult-to-interpret concepts in the study of the masters, even for 
contemporary Chinese scholars.18 
These neologisms brought about a multiply confused discourse. First, Chinese 
intellectuals translated and interpreted Western philosophy via such neologisms, 
which on the one hand were foreign and Western, but on the other hand also 
familiar and ripe with traditional meaning. This shortcoming was unavoidable and is 
not part of the protests concerning the first position. A second phase of complexity, 
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also no great obstacle for them, came about when researchers of Chinese thought 
began to interpret their own ancient texts through these neologisms instead of 
through the familiar and trusted endemic concepts. The fact that the Chinese masters 
have not always come out of this complex operation in the best light is a point of 
criticism of the second position that we shall expand upon in a moment. But what 
does present a problem for the first position-the mountain peak-is the retrospec- 
tive usurpation of the title "philosophy" by the Chinese masters, the confrontation 
that is thereby made possible, and the strange chimeras that can and often do flow 
from this confused discourse. In this way, for example, Hegel's idea of Begriff is first 
translated or explained by the above-mentioned Chinese term ii. This concept was 
important in the Neo-Confucianism of the twelfth century, in particular for the 
thinker Zhu Xi (1130-1200). As a result, one comes across mind-boggling studies 
such as the article "Short Comparative Analysis of the Theory of Li in Zhu Xi and 
Hegel"-as if Hegel had ever participated in the Chinese debate concerning ii and 
as if the philosopher Zhu Xi had preempted his Western counterpart by about seven 
centuries.19 
An analysis of this conceptual confusion explains the resentment felt by those 
within the first position. But this position also implies a significant disadvantage: the 
critics of "Chinese philosophy" betray problematic presuppositions concerning the 
nature of understanding and communication. They seem to believe intercultural 
communication or even ordinary conversation to be successful only in those cases 
where information appears to traverse the gap between the head of the transmitter 
and the head of the receiver without distortion or hindrance. This, sketched simply, 
is the prevailing ideal of communication. But the more pertinent question is whether 
this situation is even possible, let alone desirable. 
Bertrand Russell once claimed that fruitful communication consists precisely of 
the opposite, that it results from the discontinuity between the different contexts in 
which a concept comes to be articulated and from the new associations to which it 
may give rise there.20 If a partner in conversation were to repeat one's words entirely 
unchanged, like a mere echo, then one would very strongly suspect that neither 
understanding nor any form of communication had taken place. One experiences 
something as fruitful communication only when the response or explanation differs. 
The seeds of communication that we spread about seem to take root in a somewhat 
foreign soil. Difference is a sign of understanding, but it can also be a source of 
misunderstanding. Successful understanding is closely related to understanding dif- 
ferently, and thus also-and perhaps inevitably-to misunderstanding. Thus, under- 
standing and misunderstanding present themselves not as clearly distinguished 
poles, but rather as rivals, nevertheless intimately bound to each other. It is becom- 
ing increasingly difficult, although no less important, to keep the two apart. The 
melting pot of misunderstandings resulting from the fact of China's self-molded 
philosophy has parallels in the Roman adoption of Greek concepts, the Chinese 
translation of Buddhist notions, and, indeed, on a smaller scale, in every form of 
interpretation or conversation.21 
A vision of communication that attempts to overcome all difference begins with 
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an equally erroneous expectation of transparency, as if Westerners could have 
perfect insight into the meaning of Western terms, and the Chinese into theirs. 
The meanings that words contain are not only multiple and changeable but also 
not crystal clear. The term "philosophy" is, in fact, a good example of this. In the 
seventeenth century, the missionaries did not find it difficult to brand Confucius' 
Analects or the Book of Changes as philosophy, since they maintained a far wider 
concept of philosophy than what tends to be the case today. Even the division of 
science as a separate domain of knowledge had not yet taken place. From this per- 
spective, the question of whether ancient Chinese texts can be called "philosophy" 
is not so much a Chinese problem but the result of a severe contraction of the notion 
"philosophy" in the West. Promoters of the first position should as a consequence 
remove many ancient Greeks texts, together with the Chinese masters, from the 
general "Introduction to Philosophy" course. Modern interpretations often (and 
partly inevitably) do with Plato's writings what Feng Youlan did with the masters: 
select, systematize, and present them in contemporary terms. 
An Evaluation of the Second Position 
With Feng Youlan we are now in the midst of the second position. Feng believes that 
Chinese philosophy truly does exist and furthermore insists upon interpreting the 
masters with a predominantly Western philosophical jargon. An initial advantage 
of this approach is that a dialogue with Western colleagues was made possible: 
through Feng Youlan's books presenting Confucius' "humanism" and Mozi's "utili- 
tarianism," the masters were given a recognizable place within a familiar discourse. 
Thus, for the first time, this rich and fascinating intellectual heritage was made 
accessible to a wide audience in the West, thanks not only to its philological but 
above all to its conceptual translation. A second advantage of this approach is that 
the Chinese public was given a new perspective on their own tradition. Even today, 
Chinese scholars experience this renewal as a release from a fossilized Confucian 
tradition, which after more than twenty centuries had exhausted its potential for 
debate and renewal and no longer appeared appropriate for the modern challenges 
confronting the country. Feng Youlan's orientation has allowed for communication 
and a renewed reflection, without losing the focus upon difference. 
The disadvantages of this position have already been mentioned with the 
advantages of the first. But while the emphasis there was on the Western rejection of 
an unfair identification between the "masters" and the "philosophers," we can now 
focus on the disadvantages for the Chinese masters themselves. By forcing them into 
a philosophical jargon, traditional Chinese discussions and insights risk being cut 
into incoherent pieces: one throws together what does not belong together, and 
misses connections that are crucial within the Chinese context. Westerners who 
search for maxims and universal principles in ancient Chinese texts are like Chinese 
masters who would sift through the whole corpus of Western texts-from political 
manifestos to philosophical treatises-in search of prescriptions for coffins, without 
taking into account our current intellectual categories or philosophical interests. Due 
to ritual stipulations, the thickness of coffins was a controversial topic for the Chinese 
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masters but has not been coherently dealt with in the West, except perhaps in the 
trade literature of funeral directors. A pernicious result of such intellectual mutilation 
is that the Chinese insights are exposed as primitive or naive forms of familiar 
Western concepts, insights, and discussions that are themselves never called into 
question. 
In the People's Republic, such a critique is almost unheard of. Despite the few 
critical voices that have come and gone, the philosophical jargon has remained to a 
large degree unscathed.22 The dominant study of the masters-after the Marxist 
intermezzo and since the Open Door politics of Deng Xiaoping (1979)-is again 
beginning to reveal a resemblance to Feng Youlan's approach from before the 
1960s. But through increasing contact with Western colleagues and no doubt as a 
result of independent evolutions and growing nationalism, more and more Chinese 
scholars are beginning to question the influence of Western philosophical jargon, 
originally and above all in Taiwan and Singapore, but also increasingly in the 
People's Republic.23 
A Conflict over Concepts 
With this evaluation, we have arrived at a point where the discussion over facts 
leads into subtler argumentation concerning the concept of "philosophy" itself. Feng 
Youlan's work and the reaction to it from both China scholars and Chinese scholars 
reveals how explication and argumentation at the level of facts leads to a discussion 
of concepts.24 I will appeal to the distinction made in analytical philosophy between 
the "descriptive" and "emotive" meaning of terms, to divide discussions concerning 
the notion "philosophy" into two major types: on the one hand those that instigate a 
renewed definition of the content of this notion (its descriptive, conceptual meaning) 
and on the other those that dispute its current appreciation (the emotive meaning). 
As an illustration of these different argumentative strategies, one could consider two 
opposite approaches to the notion of "etiquette" as different ways to defend one's 
preference to eat with bare hands at a banquet. One strategy would be to state that 
this behavior constitutes "true etiquette," departing from the common content of this 
notion, but preserving its currently positive appreciation; the alternative would be to 
attack the prevalent value of etiquette in general, without challenging its prevalent 
meaning (eating with a knife and fork) in our society.25 Viewed from this perspec- 
tive, the opposition between the two initial positions in the debate on "Chinese 
philosophy" is based on a remarkably common implicit ground, where neither the 
positive appreciation nor the current interpretation of the notion "philosophy" are 
being questioned. 
One would imagine that the sharpest possible contrast with this common ground 
would be a position that undermines both of these presuppositions by questioning 
the prevalent understanding of philosophy as well as its value. But this position, 
understandably, has few supporters: one who feels nothing for philosophy is unlikely 
to take the effort to lend it new content. For the two most important alternatives 
to come to light in the next steps, attention to one of the two kinds of meaning is 
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generally, but not necessarily, emphasized at the expense of the other. It is far from 
surprising that a positive appreciation of philosophy will demand a new and broader 
interpretation of the term, allowing the ancient Chinese masters to take part in it. 
Similarly, it is normal that a break with the current appreciation of philosophy does 
not invite a new content of the term. 
Thus, we shall discuss as a third position the view that presupposes the value 
of philosophy while explicitly questioning its prevalent content. This view is often 
related to the second position-the assertion that Chinese philosophy exists- 
providing it with a more explicit defense and argumentative force. As a fourth posi- 
tion we shall discuss the view that does not question the prevailing interpretation of 
the term, but rather the value of the philosophical project: why should China even 
have had a philosophy? This position accompanies the first, but is more elaborate 
and predominantly Chinese in its representation and concern. 
Third Position: What Is the Meaning of "Philosophy"? 
The third position is held above all by sinologists with philosophical training and, 
analogously, by philosophers with sinological training. They claim, on the one hand, 
that the tradition of the Chinese masters sufficiently resembles the wider Western 
philosophical tradition-and not simply its modern variant-to be labeled as phi- 
losophy. After all, the masters pose questions of deep human concern while sub- 
stantiating their ideas with examples and arguments. On the other hand, their themes 
and forms of reasoning are sometimes so fundamentally different from those of their 
Western counterparts that the Chinese masters offer a unique opportunity to ques- 
tion, in a philosophical manner, the current notion of "philosophy" itself. 
Indeed, this may be something that Western philosophers tirelessly continue to 
do: strive for the ideal of objectivity or open-mindedness. Within the humanities this 
ideal can best be realized in confrontation with what is most different; and what is 
more different from our Western philosophical tradition than ancient Chinese 
thought? The third position admits that the adjective "Chinese" does have an influ- 
ence on the term "philosophy," but a beneficial one, because it breaks through 
the unarticulated-and therefore even stronger-modern limitations of the notion 
"philosophy" and its dominant categories. 
Those who support the broadening of the prevailing term "philosophy" to 
encompass the Chinese masters perceive in Chinese thought not only the advantage 
of an entirely new perspective, but even a valuable alternative for what many con- 
sider to be an inveterate metaphysical tradition with its sharp contrast between 
reality and language, prescription and description, saying and doing, objective 
and subjective, self and other, and so on. It is no coincidence that the push 
for this appreciation of the Chinese heritage has arisen at the hands of critics of 
the Western tradition. According to them, we must focus our attention not on those 
ancient Chinese ideas that, after some adaptation, can be taken up within the circles 
of Western discussion, but precisely on those ideas that seem stubbornly subversive 
toward concepts and categories from the West. 
A good example of this position is Herbert Fingarette, who, inspired by John 
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Austin's vision of performative language use, rediscovered the value of the ritual 
word in the Analects of Confucius. In his small but influential book Confucius: The 
Secular as Sacred, he also reacts against the familiar subjective, psychologizing 
interpretation in terms of internal intention versus external deeds. The reversal, 
which Fingarette describes in his Preface, is typical for this third group: 
When I began to read Confucius, I found him to be a prosaic and parochial moralizer; 
his collected sayings, the Analects, seemed to me an archaic irrelevance. Later, with 
increasing force, I found him a thinker, with profound insights and with an imaginative 
vision of man equal in its grandeur to any I know. Increasingly, I have become convinced 
that Confucius can be a teacher to us today-a major teacher, not one who merely gives 
us a slightly exotic perspective on ideas already current. He tells us things not being said 
elsewhere-things needing to be said. He has a new lesson to teach.26 
Thus Fingarette reacts against the traditional interpretation of Confucius that is char- 
acteristic for the second group and that, according to him, represents the master as 
an uninteresting variation of dusty old Western ideas. 
Fourth Position: What Is the Value of "Philosophy"? 
Philosophy is not universal, nor is it a trait of rationality, but is a typically Western 
discourse, with its strengths (such as the ideals of neutrality and universality) as 
well as its weaknesses (e.g., its limited and purely academic scope).27 Just as 
shadowboxing (taijiquan) is having success in the West, philosophy is spreading 
with much prolificacy through China, but this takes nothing away from either of their 
original cultural bounds. With this idea, a minority of mainly Chinese intellectuals 
constitutes a fourth and final major position. 
Philosophy is, and remains, a primarily Western cultural product, a strange 
and useless conversation in which European tribes have trained themselves, full of 
earnestness and sedulity. It is a very specific discourse that for some reason or other 
has maintained a high level of subscription in the mysterious West. I have yet to find 
this possible variation of the fourth position in Chinese sources, but it challenges in a 
powerful way the implicitvaluation enjoyed by philosophy in the previous positions. 
The fourth position is closely connected to the first, which is proclaimed by mainly 
Western proponents, but it replaces the implicit appreciation for philosophy by one 
or more explicit emotive meanings, such as contempt, pity, indifference, wonder, or 
admiration. 
One variant of this position explicitly admires philosophy and denounces the 
bankruptcy of the Chinese tradition. Intellectuals attack China for its lack of philos- 
ophy and other Western values; the May Fourth Movement of 1919 and the "culture 
craze" (wenhua -'fZ,) of the 1980s were moments in which this vision was rela- 
tively strong. But not all voices in this group resound with a sharpness equal to that 
of Liu Xiaobo (b. 1955), who prefers Western philosophy for its intellectual fasci- 
nation and because of its superiority, according to him, over traditional Chinese 
thought. He even goes so far as to claim that Western philosophy is necessary to 
haul China out of its backwardness. The only thing that can save China, so he has 
said in a controversial interview, "is three hundred years of foreign colonization."28 
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A milder variant of the fourth position has become more current since the 
"national tradition craze" (guoxue m^,) of the 1990s. Nowadays one seldom 
hears it said that philosophy is Western without the qualification that the Chinese 
tradition can boast a worthy alternative in a corpus of masters. This variant charac- 
terizes Western philosophy as closely linked with, although also rivaling, religion 
and science, while the Chinese masters are said to offer a compass for navigating 
through one's personal, family, social, and political life. A certain congeniality with 
their own tradition often lies hidden beneath such comparisons. Here one shares 
with the third group an interest in traditional Chinese thought without, however, 
redefining the descriptive meaning of the term philosophy. Here also one can see the 
desire to protect the masters' corpus from philosophical mutilation.29 
An extreme version of this variation would have it that Westerners and Chinese 
simply cannot understand each other's thought because they differ so fundamen- 
tally. Liu Dong, a researcher at the Academy of Social Sciences, even claims that 
non-Chinese are entirely unable to grasp either past, present, or future Chinese 
thought. Sinologists or China scholars also lack the right feel for the Chinese context. 
They do not understand the "consciousness" with which China deals with its com- 
plex situation, and they allow themselves to be led astray by their own interests and 
new trends. Even Chinese scholars working abroad misinterpret Chinese thought, 
according to Liu, as they view China through Western philosophically colored 
glasses.30 Even though a famous Chinese proverb claims that "standing on mount Lu 
one cannot see the true face of the mountain," and that distance can thus be intel- 
lectually advantageous, Liu Dong articulates a much-held view among Chinese 
scholars.31 
To conclude, there are two prevailing Western varieties of this fourth position: 
one is the explicit response of Western philosophy professors challenged to ground 
their implicit position. It is then that they gladly accept the compromise that grants 
China, as a consolation prize, the patent on a sort of practical wisdom or pragmatic 
sensibility. As a consequence they need not adapt either the content or the title of 
their "Introduction to Philosophy." And finally, the sinological variant considers 
many Chinese texts philosophically interesting because they question trusted cate- 
gories, but it does not therefore consider the teachings of the ancient master to be 
"philosophy." The resemblance to the Western philosophical tradition is, of course, 
quite real-otherwise there would be no confrontation. But the identification of both 
traditions has brought with it so much confusion that they find it too problematic. 
Evaluation of the Conceptual Discussions 
Due to the fact that both these varieties are an elaboration of the first two positions, 
they are deserving of more or less the same evaluation. Thus we shall limit ourselves 
here to the respective conceptual components of their arguments. Here again the 
evaluation has already been implicitly posed by the argumentation of the opposing 
position. 
The third position deserves appreciation for its critical orientation toward 
the currently limited notion of philosophy. The Chinese masters can indeed be 
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philosophically more interesting in their resistance to prevalent philosophical cate- 
gories than in their awkward incorporation within them. The absence in Confucius 
of an "internal" realm harboring thoughts and emotions is not necessarily a weak- 
ness of his thought, nor is the panoply of contradictory stipulations in the Analects 
necessarily a failure in clear thinking. China's foremost master does not always need 
correction at the hands of modern philosophers, and he also challenges our domi- 
nant metaphors (locating emotions inside) and academic habits (demanding strict 
definitions). Such a defense of the Chinese masters has a further implication, namely 
that it also reacts against an all-too-modern interpretation of premodern Western 
thinkers. 
But the arguments of the third position have their weaknesses: as critique, they 
alert us to the influence of subconscious presuppositions, but their positive alterna- 
tive is less convincing. With the bursting of the borders of the modern concept of 
philosophy, all Chinese masters are suddenly granted asylum in the field. Thus, an 
unchecked conceptual expansion allows room not only for the aphorisms of Laozi 
and the sayings of Confucius, but also, by analogy, for Biblical orations and para- 
bles. An all-too-generous expansion of the term "philosophy" leads to a concept that 
encompasses almost everything-and that, therefore, means almost nothing. 
Where the third position mainly concerns itself with questioning the content of 
the term "philosophy," the contribution of the fourth position is its explicit attention 
to its emotive meaning. The Chinese masters need not undergo a philosophical 
"face-lift" in order to be interesting; indeed, they need not even be considered 
instantiations of philosophy. But here again lies the weakness of this position: in the 
danger that one assumes the ability to complete this critical attitude with a positive 
alternative. The more self-assured the alternative, the greater this danger is. The 
conviction that only China has unproblematic access to its own tradition is a kind of 
nationalistic counterpart of the universalism defended by the second position. Just as 
the notion "philosophy" to some extent remains inaccessible for contemporary 
Westerners, ancient Chinese ideas remain foreign to contemporary Chinese scholars. 
Not only is it impossible to turn back the clock and to purge China of all Western 
influence (the philosophical jargon included), but the ideal of transparent com- 
munication and perfect self-knowledge are also myths that are susceptible to the 
remarks made in the evaluation of the first position. It is not because we do not 
entirely understand the Chinese-and do not understand them in their own terms- 
that we therefore do not understand them at all. To "entirely understand" is the 
unattainable ideal of a problematic vision of understanding and communication. 
A Conflict of Sensitivities 
We have now exposed the first building blocks of a largely unarticulated ebate. The 
four positions presented are not meant as descriptions of actual visions, but rather as 
types of argumentation and illustrations thereof. The sketchy presentation of each 
separate position has sometimes made explicit what many have never stated, while 
it has silenced arguments that sometimes do arise in concrete discussions. In order to 
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represent in a precise and orderly fashion as many actual points of view as possible 
on the basis of these foundations, one would have to expand further upon a wide 
range of variations and combinations. 
With this abundance of various visions concerning the legitimacy of Chinese 
philosophy, the reader perhaps wonders why this problematic has been branded an 
"implicit debate." The arguments that have been presented do indeed belong to 
a minority, and the elaboration of the last two positions in particular is relatively 
recent. But the fact that only a minority concern themselves with a question does not 
make the debate "implicit," as if one expected the whole world to be concerned 
with every problem. The debate is implicit in the sense that dominant and opposing 
opinions implicitly prevail with a certainty that is hardly ever questioned and that 
apparently requires no rational foundation. The four positions and their variations 
offer arguments that could support these various certainties but that have not led to 
consensus, nor have they been capable of significantly changing the reality of the 
situation. Fixation upon this argumentation and an endless progression of it has a 
pernicious consequence, namely that attention is being diverted from something 
entirely different: the sensitivity surrounding the entire problematic and the ineffec- 
tiveness of the respective arguments to break through it. 
Both the sensitivity and the indecision characteristic of this discussion have to do 
with the fact that the concept "philosophy" is opaque for us, too. Every philosopher 
has his or her own vision and doubts about philosophy, which are usually discussed 
or temporarily settled during the first hours of class. The prevailing doubt and lack of 
consensus, however, do not discourage our institutions from continuing to function 
with an implicit, opaque, yet highly resistant notion of philosophy. This notion 
determines that the Bible, Proust, and Kundera generally do not form part of the 
curriculum, nor do non-Western thinkers, particularly if they are from the ancient 
past. But the literary extravagances of Nietzsche and the loose reflections of the late 
Wittgenstein are generally taught as philosophy, despite their striking resemblance, 
respectively, to the provocative fantasies of Zhuangzi and the sporadic utterances of 
Confucius. 
It seems that the philosophers of our curriculum do not share one, albeit for the 
time being disputed, essence with one another, but rather various and particular 
characteristics, such as the multiple, overlapping resemblances of family members. 
Thus seen, philosophy appears to be a concrete, culturally bound, diverse, and dis- 
persed whole of conversations constantly referring to each other. Founded in Greek 
soil, it has now grown over twenty-five centuries within a specific culture, language 
group, and ethos. Even though ever-larger parts of the world are now taking part in 
this conversation, it remains a Western cultural product that influences its new 
interlocutors while being influenced by them. 
The appeal to Wittgenstein's idea of family resemblances32 is not intended only 
to follow his lead in deserting the search for a common essence dwelling behind its 
manifestations or to minimize the relevance of the discussions sketched out above 
and thus settle the dispute in favor of the first position. The analogy with family 
resemblances can be further developed in a positive way, setting the debate on a 
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new track. The members of a family may not all share a common essence, but there 
is something else that binds them: a family name. In contrast to a concept, whose 
meaning (be it either emotive or descriptive) may form the object of debate, the 
family name is something arbitrary and empty of meaning (except perhaps for the 
concrete reference to other family members or bearers of the same name). A family 
name has no abstract essence and cannot be defined. The sensitivity of discussions 
concerning philosophy lies also, as I will argue, in the fact that this term to some 
extent functions like a family name. 
The history of philosophy in the West can then be read as the chronicle of a 
large family. Descendants of the clan are usually born through studying, lecturing, 
and publishing in philosophy. Now and then a bastard is spawned-from literature, 
linguistics, history, or anthropology-whose right to the family name is unclear or 
disputed. Adoption can incite protest, particularly when a whole group of foreign 
masters come knocking at the door-a reaction that characterizes the first position. 
An outsider cannot just adopt our name without justification, even though we don't 
quite know why we ourselves are deserving of that name. The protest cannot be 
adequately founded because there are no intrinsic reasons to let anyone in or keep 
them out. But the absence of a clear criterion of what philosophy is only makes the 
question that much more sensitive. The emptiness of the family name maintains 
the insecurity concerning the question of not only who has rights to it but also the 
responsibilities it imposes. One must hold the name high, but what are its demands? 
Confirmation comes from the onlookers (who knew our forefathers and the ideals for 
which they stood), whose scrutinizing gaze accompanies us. 
Our Chinese colleagues find themselves in a similar though even more sensitive 
predicament: their academic activity also derives meaning from the framework 
within which they operate (the philosophy department), while they are aware that 
one of their forefathers was an adopted child. They know that even after a century, 
Western philosophers often do not consider them family members of equal standing. 
For this reason, some of them reject the adoption and wish to continue without the 
name and demands of "philosophy," an option taken on board by the fourth group. 
The majority of Chinese, however-constituting the second and third positions- 
propose that the masters do belong to the great philosophical family. But only the 
supporters of the third position feel themselves called upon and empowered to 
compel the family to adapt itself to its adopted children. 
This analogy is far from perfect since the term "philosophy" is not as empty and 
sensitive as a family name is: one can choose for philosophy, one can be good at it, 
and there are, after all, criteria circulating for inclusion and exclusion, as the sup- 
porters of the different positions have demonstrated. But that does not detract from 
the fact that the Western relation to philosophy also bears something of the duplic- 
itous position within which the family name places us: we are attached to something 
that remains inaccessible to us; we are rooted in our own "uprootedness."33 Insofar 
as the disagreement over the existence of Chinese philosophy displays analogies 
with such a family dispute, reflection over name giving and adoption ought to be 
part of our reflection. Of course, the further expandable arguments aimed at giving 
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the various positions a foundation remain relevant, but along with them one must 
maintain some focus on the vulnerability that hides behind the self-assuredness of 
these arguments. 
We are deeply attached to philosophy; we are proud of it and indebted to it, but 
all this without conclusive argument. The adopted child also finds itself in this 
divided situation but it plays with more options for escape. The real question, how- 
ever, is whether there are alternatives that can offer our Chinese colleagues a per- 
fectly hospitable home. The fourth option, namely to leave philosophy altogether 
and settle down within one's own thought tradition-and in the extreme case to 
exclude all foreigners-strives for a sense of homeliness and security of which some 
Westerners in the first position also dream. Not only are both groups overtaken by 
the historical clock (the institutional existence of "Chinese philosophy" in China 
cannot be undone), but they also leave no room for the un-homeliness that exists in 
every family, not only for adopted children but for every descendant. To focus one's 
attention exclusively on the rational arguments in the question of the existence of 
Chinese philosophy and to maintain an inflexible attitude within the ensuing debate 
represent attempts to settle definitively the vulnerability of our existence-attempts 
ultimately destined for failure. 
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